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Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication
Ronen Gradwohl∗ Niklas Hahn† Martin Hoefer‡ Rann Smorodinsky§
Abstract
The Bayesian persuasion paradigm of strategic communication models interaction between a pri-
vately-informed agent, called the sender, and an ignorant but rational agent, called the receiver. The
goal is typically to design a (near-)optimal communication (or signaling) scheme for the sender. It
enables the sender to disclose information to the receiver in a way as to incentivize her to take an action
that is preferred by the sender. Finding the optimal signaling scheme is known to be computationally
difficult in general. This hardness is further exacerbated when there is also a constraint on the size
of the message space, leading to NP-hardness of approximating the optimal sender utility within any
constant factor.
In this paper, we show that in several natural and prominent cases the optimization problem is
tractable even when the message space is limited. In particular, we study signaling under a symmetry
or an independence assumption on the distribution of utility values for the actions. For symmetric
distributions, we provide a novel characterization of the optimal signaling scheme. It results in a
polynomial-time algorithm to compute an optimal scheme for many compactly represented symmetric
distributions. In the independent case, we design a constant-factor approximation algorithm, which
stands in marked contrast to the hardness of approximation in the general case.
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1 Introduction
Recommendations play a vital role in the modern information economy: Online retailers make prod-
uct recommendations, travel websites provide advice on hotels and attractions, navigation apps suggest
driving routes, and so on. In all these examples, the designers of the recommendation systems have in-
formation that consumers do not, and both sides benefit from communication. However, the interests of
the consumers and the recommenders are not always aligned. For example, while consumers may prefer
to purchase products that constitute a better bargain, retailers may prefer to sell products for which they
obtain higher margins. A natural goal is to optimize the use of the retailer’s informational advantage,
such that recommendations result in consumer choices that maximize its own benefit. In doing so, the
retailer must account for the consumers’ interests to guarantee that recommendations are being followed.
This optimization problem fits into the Bayesian persuasion paradigm of [24], a fundamental model of
strategic communication proposed in economics that has recently gained significant interest in algorithmic
game theory. In this model there are two players: a sender S with information about a so-called state
of nature, and a receiver R who takes an action. Payoffs of the two players are determined both by the
action chosen by R and by the state of nature. A priori, the players do not know the true state of nature,
but rather share a common belief (i.e., a distribution) over the possible outcomes. However, S obtains
information about the realized state of nature, and then sends a message (called a signal) to R. After
receiving the signal, R takes an action, and payoffs are realized.
A distinguishing feature of the Bayesian persuasion model is that S commits to a signaling scheme
before the state of nature is realized. A signaling scheme is a (possibly randomized) function from states of
nature to signals. The action for S can be cast as choosing a signaling scheme that determines the signal
once the state of nature is realized. This problem becomes interesting, above and beyond a standard
optimization, when S and R have misaligned preferences with different optimal actions in various states.
How can S make optimal use of her informational advantage in steering R’s choice of action?
The problem of optimally designing recommendation systems fits neatly into this model. To illus-
trate, consider the following simple example: S is a retailer that makes a product recommendation to a
consumer, R, who must choose one of the products. The various products yield different utilities to each
of the players and, while S knows which product yields which utilities, from R’s perspective the products
are randomly ordered. The state of nature is the order in which the products appear, and the signaling
scheme is the recommendation system implemented by the retailer.
To make the example concrete, suppose there are three products: One product is good for S and bad
for R, one is bad for S but good for R, and one is bad for both. Denote these respective products by GB,
BG, and BB, and suppose they yield sender-receiver utility pairs (1, 0), (0, 1), and (0, 0), when chosen.
One signaling scheme for the sender is to always reveal which product is which. In this case R will choose
BG, and S will attain utility 0. A better scheme for S is to reveal no information. Here the best R can
do is choose randomly, in which case S’s utility will be 1/3. One might attempt to improve S’s utility
by always recommending GB. However, this policy is not persuasive: R’s optimal reaction is to deviate
to choosing one of the other two products at random, and again S’s utility will be 0. Nonetheless, S can
do better than the no-information scheme by choosing a scheme that recommends GB with probability
2/3 and BG with probability 1/3. A straightforward calculation using Bayes’ Rule shows that R cannot
improve by deviating from this recommendation, and that following it leads to sender utility of 2/3. This,
in fact, is the optimal signaling scheme for S.
In this paper we study potential barriers to optimal signaling, focusing on two constraints: limited
communication and limited computational resources. First, in our example above, the optimal signaling
scheme needs a signal space of size 3, as each of the three products could potentially be GB or BG.
But what if she was restricted to sending only one of 2 signals? More generally, suppose there are n
products, but S is restricted to only k signals. These restrictions arise naturally, e.g., when there is
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a limited attention span, or communication between the players is noisy and a limited number of bits
can be transferred. Typically, designing optimal signaling schemes can be based on the popular toolset
developed by [24]. However, these tools no longer apply when the number of available signals is limited.
Second, from a computational perspective, finding the optimal scheme might not be tractable. Suppose
in the example above there are n products, for large n. For the restricted case in which the utility-pairs
of the n products are IID and given explicitly, Dughmi and Xu [13] develop a polynomial-time algorithm
that computes the optimal scheme. Note that our example above, in which the utility-pairs are known
but their order is not, does not fall into this case. On the other hand, for general distributions over
the utility-pairs of each product (and even ones that are independent but not identical), they show that
computing the optimal sender utility is #P-hard [13].
Third, when computational concerns are combined with limited communication, the computational
problem is exacerbated. Dughmi, Xu and Qiang [11] prove a substantially stronger hardness result and
show that it is NP-hard to even approximate the optimal sender utility to within any constant factor.
Results and Contribution We analyze optimal signaling schemes subject to communication and
computation limits in the context of two specific classes of problems that we call symmetric instances
and independent instances. Symmetric instances are ones in which the a priori probability of any vector
of n utility-pairs is the same as the a priori probability of any vector in which the n elements have been
permuted. For example, we described a symmetric instance in our example above, in which the n products
appear in a random order. Another example is the IID case, in which products’ utility-pairs are drawn
i.i.d. from a single distribution. The class is more general than both examples; in Section 2 we describe
some other cases that it captures.
In Section 3.1 we study the class of symmetric instances and develop a geometric characterization of
the optimal signaling scheme. In Section 3.2 we use this characterization to design an algorithm that
computes optimal schemes. Our algorithm runs in polynomial time given access to a probability oracle
that computes certain probabilities related to the instance. We then prove that the probability oracle
can be implemented in polynomial time in many prominent subclasses of instances studied in related
literature, including but not limited to the IID and random-order cases. Our results significantly expand
the set of instances for which optimal schemes can be computed efficiently beyond the IID case in [13].
Interestingly, our results extend even to limited signal spaces. In addition to the geometric characteri-
zation of optimal signaling schemes with limited communication, our results also imply a polynomial-time
algorithm for finding such a scheme. Moreover, when relaxing the persuasiveness constraint, we show
that a bicriteria approximation can be obtained in polynomial time, see Appendix C.
In Section 4 we develop polynomial-time algorithms for finding an approximately-optimal signaling
scheme for independent instances in which the utility-pairs are independently but not identically dis-
tributed among the n actions. For this class of problems, [13] show that finding an optimal solution is
#P-hard. Our first algorithm in Section 4.1 is simple to state and implement and guarantees a constant-
factor approximation, even in the case in which the signal space is restricted to k < n signals. The ratio is
at least 0.375 for k = 2, and it approaches (1−1/e)2 ≈ 0.3996 for large k. With a significantly more elab-
orate procedure in Section 4.2, we improve the approximation ratio for large k to (1−1/e−ε) ≈ 0.632, for
any constant ε > 0. With the techniques used here it is impossible to obtain a better ratio than 1− 1/e.
These results stand in marked contrast to the hardness result of [11] for general instances, where
restrictions on the signaling space can make the optimization problem hard to approximate within any
constant factor. Our results significantly broaden the class of instances for which good approximation
algorithms are known to exist.
Finally, in Section 5 we show that restricting the number of signals from n to k hurts the optimal
sender utility by a (tight) factor of Θ(k/n) in symmetric instances and in independent instances.
2
Techniques Our main results on symmetric instances in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 use a geometric char-
acterization of the optimal signaling scheme. For every state of nature, we interpret the utility pairs
of the n actions as a set of points in the two-dimensional plane. Given a state of nature, the expected
utility of any signaling scheme can be interpreted as a recommendation point inside the convex hull of
the point set. We show that the optimal scheme has a symmetry property and, for every state of nature,
its recommendation point is located on the Pareto frontier of the point set. Their location is such that a
single common slope lies tangent to the recommendation point for every state of nature. The symmetry
property allows to tightly capture the persuasiveness constraint as a linear inequality. Using these in-
sights, we turn the computation into solving a polynomial number of linear programs. The coefficients are
probabilities derived from the Pareto frontiers of point sets of the states of nature. In this way, computing
the optimal signaling scheme reduces to computing certain probabilities. We show that for a variety of
symmetric distributions, such as IID, random-order, prophet-secretary, or explicitly represented ones (for
formal definitions see Section 2 below) computing these probabilities can be done in polynomial time.
Our results provide an alternative way to compute an optimal scheme for the IID case. The previous
approach of [13] uses symmetry to apply techniques from the literature on designing optimal auctions
with money. These techniques crucially rely on independence among bidders/actions. In contrast, our
characterization and algorithms directly exploit the structure of the persuasion problem. We can han-
dle correlations in the utility-pairs of the state of nature and obtain efficient algorithms for symmetric
instances in full generality, even in the case with limited communication.
Our approximation algorithms for independent instances in Section 4 follow a two-step approach: (a)
find a good subset of k actions and (b) use each of the k signals to recommend one action from the subset.
By dropping and relaxing some constraints of the optimal signaling scheme, we devise an LP relaxation.
For this relaxation, we prove that step (a) becomes a submodular optimization problem, for which we
use the standard greedy algorithm. For (b) we develop an algorithm turning the optimal solution of the
LP relaxation into a persuasive signaling scheme. This algorithm in Section 4.1 yields an approximation
ratio of roughly (1− 1/e) (for large k) in each of these steps. Our improved analysis in Section 4.2 then
shows that for large k the greedy algorithm for step (a) can be replaced by an FPTAS, but the factor
1 − 1/e from step (b) remains. The latter factor turns out to be tight – a further improvement must
bypass the use of the LP relaxation to upper bound the optimal sender utility.
Related Literature Originating in Aumann and Maschler’s [4] work on repeated games with incom-
plete information, Bayesian persuasion was popularized by Kamenica and Gentzkow [24]. The many
applications include financial-sector stress testing [19], medical research [26], security [31, 35, 34], online
advertisement [2, 7, 15] and voting [1]—thorough overviews include [8, 10, 23, 16].
Our paper analyzes algorithmic Bayesian persuasion with limited signal spaces, most closely related
to Dughmi and Xu [13] and Dughmi et al. [11]. The former give a poly-time algorithm to calculate the
optimal scheme for IID instances, and show that the problem is #P-hard in the independently- but not
identically-distributed case. The latter focus on bilateral trade with constrained communication, but
prove two general results: (i) only a O(#Signals#States ) factor of utility in the unconstrained communication
scenario is obtainable by the sender, and (ii) it is NP-hard to approximate the optimal sender utility
within a constant factor with a limited number of signals. Our work complements these, as we give
an optimal polynomial-time algorithm for symmetric instances, and a polynomial-time constant-factor
approximation for the class of independent instances.
Another related paper, Aybas and Turkel [5], proves the existence of an optimal scheme when signals
are limited. They also show that the sender loses at most a 2/k factor of utility when the number of
signals decreases from k to k− 1. We strengthen this result for symmetric instances by showing that the
cumulative loss when using k instead of n signals is at most (n−k)/n and this is tight. Put differently, we
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show matching lower and upper bounds of k/n on the fraction of the sender utility that can be obtained
when using k instead of n signals. Up to small constant factors, similar bounds hold for independent
instances.
More generally, extensions of algorithmic persuasion to multiple receivers have been studied by
Babichenko and Barman [6] and Arieli and Babichenko [2], who focus on private signals, as well as
Dughmi and Xu [14], who contrast private and public signals. Bhaskar et al. [9] and Rubinstein [32]
study scenarios in which the receivers are players in games, proving various hardness results. Xu [33]
gives efficient approximation algorithms for some sub-classes of these scenarios. Dughmi et al. [12] employ
Lagrangian duality to characterize near-optimal persuasion schemes, and study a further extension that
includes payments. Finally, to complement the multiple-receiver setting, multiple-sender settings have
been studied in [3, 17, 18, 29, 20].
A different approach was taken by Hahn et al. [21, 22], who design approximation algorithms for
online versions of the single-sender, single-receiver setting. In their models, the state of nature is revealed
sequentially to S, S sends a signal in each round to R, and R then makes a binary decision. Also
somewhat related is the paper of Le Treust and Tomala [28], who study a repeated setting with limited
communication through a noisy channel.
2 Model
Signaling with Limited Messages There are two agents, a sender S and a receiver R. The receiver
can take one of n actions. We denote the set of actions by [n] = {1, . . . , n}. Each action i ∈ [n]
has a type θi from a known type set Θi. We assume throughout that all type sets are finite. The
state of nature θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) is drawn according to a commonly known distribution over Θ, where
Θ ⊆ Θ1 ×Θ2 × · · · ×Θn. We denote the probability of drawing the state θ by qθ.
Action i’s type θi is associated with a value-pair (̺(θi), ξ(θi)), where ̺(θi) is the value for R and ξ(θi)
is the value for S if action i is taken by R. Both agents want to maximize their respective expected utility
from the action taken. While the distribution over states of nature is common knowledge, the realized
state θ is only observed by S. After observing θ, S sends some abstract signal σ ∈ Σ to R.
We assume that S has commitment power, i.e., S commits in advance to a signaling scheme ϕ. It
maps the observed state of nature θ to a signal σ. More formally, ϕ(θ, σ) denotes the probability that in
state θ the scheme sends signal σ. ϕ is revealed to R before θ is realized. The game we study proceeds
as follows: (1) Both players know the prior distribution q. (2) S commits to a signaling scheme ϕ and
reveals it to R. (3) The state of nature θ is realized and is revealed to S. (4) S draws signal σ according
to the distribution ϕ(θ, ·) and sends σ to R. (5) R chooses an action i ∈ [n], and utilities are realized.
In the standard case of Bayesian persuasion with |Σ| = k ≥ n, the sender can use signals to directly
recommend every possible action to the receiver. In this paper, we are interested in k < n when S might
not be able to directly recommend every single action to R. Since the case of a single signal and k = 1
is trivial, we assume k ≥ 2 throughout.
We denote the expected utility for X ∈ {S,R} by uX (ϕ) when S uses scheme ϕ and R best responds
to ϕ by picking, for every signal σ, an action with optimal expected utility conditioned on observing σ.
Given σ, if R has several optimal actions, we assume R breaks ties in favor of the sender1. If within the
set of actions with best utility for R there are several that have best utility for S, we assume w.l.o.g. that
R chooses one of them via any fixed tie-breaking rule.
We will be interested in direct and persuasive schemes. In a direct scheme, S uses each signal to
recommend a single specific action. In a persuasive scheme, the receiver has no incentive to deviate from
1This is a standard assumption in bilevel optimization problems. It is mainly used to avoid technicalities such as tiny
perturbations to break ties.
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the recommended action. When considering persuasiveness, a useful quantity is the best expected utility
of any fixed action for R, which we denote by ̺E = maxi∈[n]
∑
θ
qθ · ̺(θi).
Symmetric Instances In a symmetric instance, any two states of nature that are a permutation of
one another occur with the same probability. Formally, in a symmetric instance, qθ = qθ′ whenever θ
′ is
any permutation of θ. In particular, due to symmetry, ̺E =
∑
θ
qθ · ̺(θi) for every i ∈ [n].
Any symmetric distribution with finite type sets can be represented rather explicitly by a set of vectors,
each having n (not necessarily distinct) types, and a probability distribution over the vectors. A state of
nature θ is generated by drawing one of the vectors according to the distribution and then permuting the
chosen vector uniformly at random. We denote by d the number of vectors in the representation and call
this a d-random-order scenario. For d = 1, we obtain the random-order scenario from the introduction.
However, there are also interesting symmetric distributions with a much more compact representation.
For the IID scenario, the natural representation is only a type distribution for a single action from which
we draw n times to generate the state of nature. In the vector-based d-random-order representation, d
could be exponential in the number of types for a single action. Hence, we also study a more compactly
represented prophet-secretary scenario: Here we have n (not necessarily distinct) distributions over types.
The state of nature θ is generated by an independent random draw from each of the n distributions and
a subsequent uniform random permutation of the n types. The name stems from the literature on online
algorithms. The prophet-secretary scenario strictly generalizes both IID and random-order scenarios.
For simplicity, we will assume throughout that all types are indeed distinct. Note that this assumption
will be without loss of generality, since we allow distinct types to be associated with the same pair of
utility values for S and R.
Independent Instances In an independent instance, every action i ∈ [n] has a type space Θi. For
simplicity we assume that the sets Θi are distinct, where we note that distinct types can have the same
utility pairs. For each action i ∈ [n] we have a distribution over types. We denote the probability of
type θi ∈ Θi by qi,θi . The state of nature θ is generated by an independent draw from each of the n
distributions.
Direct and Persuasive We assume the sender has only 2 ≤ k ≤ n possible signals. Every instance
with k signals has an optimal direct and persuasive scheme. For symmetric instances we can assume these
are the first k actions. The proof is a simple revelation-principle-style argument and given in Appendix A.
Lemma 1. There exists an optimal scheme with k signals that is direct and persuasive and uses the signals
to recommend k distinct actions. In symmetric instances, there is an optimal direct and persuasive scheme
in which S recommends the actions from [k].
3 Symmetric Instances
3.1 Characterization of Optimal Schemes
In this section, we derive a characterization of an optimal scheme in symmetric instances. Due to Lemma 1
we consider a direct and persuasive scheme that recommends actions from the set [k]. Suppose we are
given a realization θ of the state of nature. We interpret the action types as points in the two-dimensional
plane. Type θi corresponds to point (̺(θi), ξ(θi)) . We use C to denote the realized set of action types of
the first k actions.
Given any direct and persuasive scheme ϕ, consider the event that the state of nature gives rise to a
set C of types for the first k actions. We denote the probability of this event by qC = Pr
[⋃
i∈[k]{θi} = C
]
.
Conditioned on the set C of types of the first k actions, consider the point composed of the expected
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utilities for R and S, i.e., the point (E [uR(ϕ) | C] ,E [uS(ϕ) | C]). Graphically, this point lies inside the
convex hull of the points of C. We term this the recommendation point for C of ϕ.
More generally, let us define a point collection. A point collection P contains for each set C of action
types for the first k actions a point p(C) = (pR(C), pS(C)) inside the convex hull of C. We define the
utilities of S and R for P by
uS(P) =
∑
C
qC · pS(C) and uR(P) =
∑
C
qC · pR(C) .
Observe that the recommendation points of a direct and persuasive signaling scheme are a point collection,
and the utility of the collection equals the utility of the scheme, for both S and R. However, in general
a point collection might not correspond to a persuasive signaling scheme.
Our interest lies in point collections where, for every subset C, the point lies on the corresponding
Pareto frontier of C. Graphically speaking, the Pareto frontier of C can be assumed to start from a type
with largest sender utility with a horizontal line (possibly of length 0) with slope 0 and end at a type
with largest receiver utility with a vertical line (again, possibly of length 0) with slope −∞. Hence, for
every slope s ∈ [0,−∞], there is a point on the Pareto frontier such that a line with slope s lies tangent
to the Pareto frontier at this point. We say that a type or a point corresponds to a slope s if a line with
slope s lies tangent to the Pareto frontier in the point.
We concentrate on point collections that satisfy the following slope condition.
Definition 1. For s ≤ 0, a point collection P is s-Pareto if (1) for every subset C, p(C) is on the Pareto
frontier of C and corresponds to slope s and (2) uR(P) ≥ ̺E.
Our first main result is a characterization of an optimal scheme via an s-Pareto point collection.
Theorem 1. For every symmetric instance, there is an optimal scheme whose recommendation points
are a sender-optimal s-Pareto point collection, over all s ≤ 0.
We prove the theorem using the following three lemmas. First, we show that for every persuasive
scheme ϕ, there is an s-Pareto point collection P with uS(P) ≥ uS(ϕ).
Lemma 2. For every direct and persuasive scheme ϕ, there is an s-Pareto point collection P with
uS(P) ≥ uS(ϕ).
Proof. Consider an arbitrary persuasive scheme ϕ that uses signals corresponding to the first k actions.
Let P(ϕ) be the point collection of recommendation points of ϕ. Since ϕ is persuasive, the collection
P(ϕ) satisfies the second condition of s-Pareto. Now we adjust P(ϕ) in two steps to show the lemma.
First, move every recommendation point up vertically to the Pareto frontier. This improves the sender
utility of the point collection but keeps the receiver utility the same. Hence, the resulting point collection
P has all points on the Pareto frontiers, continues to satisfy uR(P) ≥ ̺E, and uS(P
′) ≥ uS(ϕ).
Second, suppose there are different subsets C1 6= C2 and there is no common slope that points
p(C1) and p(C2) both correspond to. We use the short notation p1 = (̺1, ξ1) = (pR(C1), pS(C1)) and
p2 = (̺2, ξ2) = (pR(C1), pS(C2)), respectively. In particular, suppose p1 corresponds to slope s1 and p2
to slope s2 < s1. As the slopes are non-positive, s2 is “steeper” than s1.
We construct a new point collection P1. For any subset C 6= C1, C2 of types of the first k actions, we
keep p(C). For sets C1 and C2 we adjust the points – we set
p′1 = (̺1 + δqC2 , ξ1 + δqC2s1) and p
′
2 = (̺2 − δqC1 , ξ2 − δqC1s2)
by some sufficiently small δ > 0. Intuitively, we move p1 to the “right” for the set C1 and to the “left”
for C2 – thereby shifting the points along the segments on their respective Pareto frontiers. This implies
that the sender utility of the point collection grows to
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uS(P1) =
∑
C 6=C1,C2
qC · pS(C) + qC1 · (ξ1 + δqC2s1) + qC2 · (ξ2 − δqC1s2)
= uS(P) + qC1δqC2 · (s1 − s2) > uS(P) ≥ uS(ϕ) ,
since 0 ≥ s1 > s2. For the receiver utility
uR(P1) =
∑
C 6=C1,C2
qC · pR(C) + qC1 · (̺1 + δqC2) + qC2 · (̺2 − δqC1)
= uR(P) + qC1δqC2 − qC2δqC1 = uR(P) ≥ ̺E .
Hence, P1 satisfies the second property of s-Pareto, while improving the utility for the sender.
δ is chosen such that p′1 and p
′
2 both stay on the line segments of slopes s1 and s2, respectively.
Now repeated application of this modification yields collections P2,P3, . . . until finally points p1 and p2
correspond to at least one common slope: Whenever an endpoint of a line segment is reached, if this
endpoint does not correspond to a slope of the other point, the process can be continued. Moreover, we
can apply this modification repeatedly as long as there are two size-k-sets C1, C2 of types with points that
have no common slope. Eventually, we reach an s-Pareto point collection P with uS(P) ≥ uS(ϕ).
Consider any s-Pareto point collection P. We define a direct scheme ϕ∗ as follows: Given a set C
of types in the first k actions and the point p(C), ϕ∗ recommends one of the (at most) two actions
that compose the corresponding line segment of p(C) on the Pareto frontier. The actions are chosen
independently of their actual number within the first k actions. By setting appropriate probabilities, the
point p(C) corresponds to the (conditioned on the given set C) expected utilities of ϕ∗ for S and R. This
directly implies that uS(ϕ
∗) = uS(P) and uR(ϕ
∗) = uR(P).
Due to symmetry of the instance and a choice of action independent of its number within the first
k actions, the scheme ϕ∗ is symmetric. A symmetric scheme ϕ (see also [13]) is direct and recommends
with each signal a distinct action in [k]. The conditional distribution over types (resulting from the prior
and ϕ) is the same for each recommended action. The conditional distribution over types is the same for
each non-recommended action in [k] and the same for each non-recommended action in [n]\ [k], no matter
which (other) action is recommended. Thus, a symmetric scheme gives rise to three distributions over
types: a distribution Dyes for any recommended action, a distribution Dno for any non-recommended
action in [k], and a distribution Dnever for any non-recommended action in [n] \ [k]. For symmetric
schemes, we show that persuasiveness is equivalent to the following simple constraint.
Lemma 3. In symmetric instances, a symmetric scheme ϕ is persuasive if and only if uR(ϕ) ≥ ̺E.
Proof. Clearly, if a scheme ϕ guarantees strictly less utility than ̺E to R, thenR could profit by deviating
to, say, action 1 throughout. Hence, uR(ϕ) ≥ ̺E is necessary for every persuasive scheme ϕ.
Consider a symmetric scheme and the three resulting type distributions Dyes, Dno and Dnever. We
denote by ̺yes, ̺no and ̺never the expectations of the utility of R for the respective distributions. The
previous lemma implies that if ϕ is persuasive, then ̺yes ≥ ̺E. Now, for the reverse direction, assume
that ̺yes ≥ ̺E . Clearly, since instance and scheme are symmetric, it holds that ̺never = ̺E. Again, due
to symmetry, every action i ∈ [k] gets recommended with probability 1/k. Hence, 1
k
·̺yes+
k−1
k
·̺no = ̺E ,
and ̺yes ≥ ̺E implies ̺no ≤ ̺E . It is not profitable for R to deviate from the recommended action.
Hence, if ̺yes ≥ ̺E , then ϕ is persuasive.
The symmetric scheme ϕ∗ based on an s-Pareto point collection satisfies the constraint in Lemma 3
by definition. As such, we obtain the following result, which finishes the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 4. For every s-Pareto point collection P, there is a symmetric, direct, and persuasive signaling
scheme ϕ∗ with uS(ϕ
∗) = uS(P).
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Algorithm 1: Slope-Algorithm
Input: Symmetric instance with set Θ = Θ1 = . . . = Θn of action types and distribution q
1 S ← ∅, L← ∅
2 for every pair of types a, b ∈ Θ, a 6= b do
3 Let s be the slope of ab and set pab ← 0.
4 if s ≤ 0 then determine prob. pab that ab is on the Pareto frontier of types of actions in [k]
5 if pab > 0 then S ← S ∪ {s}
6 Sort the slopes of S: s1 < s2 < . . . < sℓ
7 Pick ℓ+ 1 auxiliary slopes: t1 < s1 < t2 < s2 < . . . < sℓ < tℓ+1
8 S ← S ∪ {t1, . . . , tℓ+1}
9 for every slope s ∈ S do
10 for every type c ∈ Θ do
11 Determine probability p
(s)
c that c is the unique point corresponding to s on the Pareto
frontier of types of actions in [k]
12 Solve the following LP to determine an s-Pareto point collection:
Max.
∑
c,d∈Θ,c 6=d
cd has slope s
pcd ·
(
α
(s)
cd ξc + (1− α
(s)
cd )ξd
)
+
∑
c∈Θ
p(s)c ξc
s.t.
∑
c,d∈Θ,c 6=d
cd has slope s
pcd ·
(
α
(s)
cd ̺c + (1− α
(s)
cd )̺d
)
+
∑
c∈Θ
p(s)c ̺c ≥ ̺E
α
(s)
cd ∈ [0, 1] for all c, d ∈ Θ
(1)
if LP (1) has feasible optimal solution α(s) then L← {(α(s), s)}.
13 return best point collection in L with corresponding slope
3.2 Efficient Computation of Optimal Schemes
The Slope-Algorithm (Algorithm 1) systematically enumerates a set S containing all meaningful candidate
slopes s for an s-Pareto point collection. For every pair of types a, b the algorithm determines the
probability (denoted by pab) that their line segment (denoted by ab) is contained in the Pareto frontier of
the set C of realizations of the first k actions. For every pair with s > 0, one type Pareto dominates the
other and the pair can be discarded. Similarly, if pab = 0, the pair can be discarded. The critical step in
the first part of the algorithm is the computation of pab in line 4. For now, we assume that the algorithm
has oracle access to these quantities via a probability oracle. We will discuss below how to implement the
probability oracle in polynomial time.
At the end of the first for-loop, the algorithm has collected in S all meaningful slopes of non-empty
segments that can appear on the Pareto frontier of the types of the first k actions. In addition to these
slopes, every Pareto-frontier can be assumed to contain all slopes from [0,−∞). An optimal scheme might
not necessarily correspond to a slope of any non-empty segment attained in the first for-loop. If it does
not, it must correspond to some slope t with si < t < si+1. Note that all slopes t ∈ (si, si+1) correspond
to the same point on the Pareto frontier. Hence, ti in line 7 can be chosen arbitrarily.
Now even if a slope s is attained by some segment ab, it might be that for some other subset of types
C, slope s only corresponds to a single point on the Pareto frontier of C. As such, the algorithm also
determines in line 11 for every s ∈ S the probability that a single type c ∈ Θ corresponds to s on the
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Pareto frontier of C. This is the critical step in the second part of the algorithm. Again, we assume that
the algorithm has oracle access to these quantities via a probability oracle. We will discuss in the next
section how to implement the probability oracle in polynomial time.
Finally, after having computed all probabilities the algorithm solves LP (1). For the LP we assume
that s is the common slope of the point collection. Clearly, for all subsets C where a single point c
corresponds to slope s, the choice is trivial. For all subsets C, in which some line segment cd with slope
s is on the Pareto frontier, there is a choice to pick a point from that segment. This choice is represented
by the variable α
(s)
cd ∈ [0, 1]. The LP optimizes point locations to maximize the expected utility for S (in
the objective function) and to guarantee at least the average utility of ̺E for R. For a given slope s, the
LP might be infeasible. However, by enumerating all relevant common slopes, the algorithm sees at least
one feasible solution. It returns the best feasible LP solution along with the slope s∗.
Note that the output of the algorithm is sufficient for S to implement an optimal persuasive scheme.
S looks at the set C of the types of the first k actions, computes the Pareto frontier, and looks for slope
s∗. If s∗ is realized by a segment ab, S recommends the action with type a with probability α
(s∗)
ab and the
action with type b with probability 1− α
(s∗)
ab . If it is realized through a single type c, S recommends this
action with probability 1.
Proposition 1. Given an efficient algorithm to compute the probability oracle, the Slope-Algorithm com-
putes an optimal direct and persuasive scheme for symmetric instances in polynomial time.
Proof. Correctness follows from the characterization in the last section and the observations above. We
denote the maximal running time of the probability oracle by To and the maximal time needed to solve
LP (1) by TLP . Let m = |Θ| denote the finite number of types. Then finding the slopes can be done in
time O(m2 · To). Sorting the slopes needs time O(m logm). For the second for-loop, we iterate through
O(m2) slopes. For each slope, we need at most m calls to the probability oracle and solve one LP of
polynomial size. Overall, the running time is O(m3 · To +m
2 · TLP ).
Using geometric properties of the utility pairs in prophet-secretary and d-random-order scenarios, we
show how to design polynomial-time probability oracles in these scenarios. For full proofs see Appendix B.
Theorem 2. An optimal signaling scheme with k signals can be computed in polynomial time for the
prophet-secretary and the d-random-order scenarios.
4 Independent Instances
In this section, we move away from symmetric instances and concentrate on the case of independent
actions. For such instances, computing the expected utility for S is #P-hard, even in the standard case
with n actions and n signals [13]. We discuss how to obtain a persuasive scheme for k signals that
guarantees a constant-factor approximation to the optimal sender utility for k signals.
We first identify an action with the highest a-priori utility ̺E for R. If there are multiple such actions,
pick one that maximizes the expected utility for S. If there are several of these, pick an arbitrary one
from these. We re-number the actions such that this is action n. Our signaling schemes use k signals to
recommend a set S ∪{n} of k actions. The signal for action n plays the role of a dummy signal (c.f. [11]).
Our signaling schemes consist of two steps: (a) choose a suitable set S of k− 1 actions, and (b) given
any set S ∪ {n} of k actions, compute a signaling scheme that recommends one of these actions. We
give two variants that follow this approach. First, in Section 4.1 we consider the Independent Scheme
ϕIS based on a greedy algorithm for step (a). The approximation guarantee is given in the subsequent
theorem. It is 3/8 = 0.375 for k = 2. For k →∞ it approaches (1− 1/e)2 ≈ 0.3996.
9
Theorem 3. The Independent Scheme ϕIS is a direct and persuasive scheme for independent instances
with k signals. It can be implemented in time polynomial in the input size. For every k ≥ 2,
uS(ϕIS) ≥
(
1−
(
1−
1
k
)k)
·
(
1−
(
1−
1
k
)k−1)
· uS(ϕ
∗) .
Subsequently, in Section 4.2, we describe an improved procedure to compute a good set S in step (a).
This improves the approximation ratio considerably for larger values of k. The ratio is at least 0.375− ε
for k = 2. For k →∞, it is at least 1− 1/e− ε.
Theorem 4. The Improved Independent Scheme ϕIIS is a direct and persuasive scheme for independent
instances with k signals. It can be implemented in time polynomial in the input size. For every k ≥ 2
and every constant ε > 0
uS(ϕIIS) ≥
(
1−
(
1−
1
k
)k)
· (1− ε) ·
(
1−
1
k
)
· uS(ϕ
∗) .
We observe below that for large values of k, this is essentially a tight guarantee for our approach. A
further improvement of the approximation ratio requires significantly different techniques.
4.1 Constant-Factor Approximation
In this section, we describe the Independent Scheme and prove Theorem 3. For each type set Θi, we
w.l.o.g. include a sufficient number of dummy types θi with qi,θi = 0 and assume that |Θi| = |Θj| = m, for
all i, j ∈ [n]. We use [m] to enumerate the possible types of each action i. Now for any subset S ⊆ [n− 1]
of the first n− 1 actions, consider a set function f : 2[n−1] → R defined by
f(S) = max


∑
i∈S∪{n}
gi(zi)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈S∪{n}
zi ≤ 1 and zi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S ∪ {n}

 (2)
where
gi(z) = Max.
m∑
j=1
xijξij
s.t.
m∑
j=1
xij ≤ z
m∑
j=1
xij̺ij ≥ ̺E ·
m∑
j=1
xij
xij ∈ [0, qij ] for all j ∈ [m]
(3)
For an intuition, we interpret zi as an overall probability of a signal for action i. Then gi(zi) maximizes
the expected utility for the sender conditioned on a probability mass of zi on action i. In LP (3), xij
describes the portion of the probability mass on type j of action i. The first constraint of LP (3) limits
the total mass of action i to at most z. The second constraint ensures that the conditional expected
utility of x for R is at least ̺E . Finally, the last constraint states that the probability of a signal for type
j is at most the probability that type j is realized.
Consider any direct and persuasive scheme ϕS∪{n} that uses |S|+1 signals to recommend the actions
S ∪ {n}. Suppose xij is the ex-post probability to recommend action i with type j in ϕS∪{n}. Clearly,
the constraints in (2) and (3) do not fully capture the constraints on xij . However, all constraints are
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Algorithm 2: ActionsGreedy
Input: Type sets Θ1, . . . ,Θn and distributions q1, . . . , qn, s.t.
∑
j qn,j̺nj = ̺E and∑
j qn,jξnj = maxi∈[n] :
∑
j qi,j̺ij=̺E
∑
j qi,jξij , parameter 2 ≤ k ≤ n
1 S ← ∅
2 for ℓ = 1, . . . , k − 1 do: Let i be an action maximizing f(S ∪ {i})− f(S) and set S ← S ∪ {i}
3 return S
Algorithm 3: ComputeSignal
Input: Type sets Θ1, . . . ,Θn and distributions q1, . . . , qn, s.t.
∑
j qn,j̺nj = ̺E and∑
j qn,jξnj = maxi∈[n] :
∑
j qi,j̺ij=̺E
∑
j qi,jξij , parameter 2 ≤ k ≤ n, set S ⊆ [n− 1] with
|S| = k − 1
1 For i ∈ S ∪ {n}, let z∗i and x
∗
i be the values of the optimal solution in f(S).
2 Order actions in S ∪ {n} such that
gi1(z
∗
i1
)
z∗i1
≥ . . . ≥
gik+1(z
∗
ik
)
z∗ik
, where we assume 00 = 0
3 for ℓ = 1, . . . , k do
4 Observe type j of action iℓ. Flip independent coin with probability x
∗
iℓ,j
/qiℓ,j for heads.
5 if coin comes up heads then return signal for action iℓ
6 return signal for action n
necessary. In particular, setting xij to the ex-post probability of recommending action i with type j in
the optimal scheme ϕ∗
S∪{n} gives a feasible solution for every LP (3), and zi =
∑m
j=1 xij is feasible for (2)
(c.f. [21, Lemma 1]). Hence, for any given subset S ∪ {n} of recommended actions, f(S) is an upper
bound on the optimal sender utility, i.e., f(S) ≥ uS(ϕ
∗
S∪{n}).
Now, consider the Independent Scheme ϕIS . It consists of two steps: (a) choose a suitable set S of k−1
actions, and (b) given any set S ∪ {n} of k actions, compute a signaling scheme that recommends one of
these actions. Step (a) is done in ActionsGreedy (Algorithm 2), step (b) in ComputeSignal (Algorithm 3).
We start our analysis by bounding the approximation of ϕIS in terms of optimal sender utility.
Towards this end, we observe that ActionsGreedy implements the greedy algorithm for submodular
maximization.
Lemma 5. f is non-negative, non-decreasing, and submodular.
Proof. f is clearly non-negative and non-decreasing – since every gj is non-negative, piece-wise linear,
and concave. Hence, f(S ∪ {j}) can only improve over f(S). To see that f is submodular, note that f
optimally distributes a unit of mass to a set of monotone, concave functions. Consider the common slope
of the functions gi for i ∈ S resulting from the optimal waterfilling assignment of z
∗
i in f(S). When going
from S to S ∪ {j}, the slope can only decrease. As a consequence, when adding more elements to S, the
z∗i are non-increasing.
Consider S ⊆ T and j 6∈ T . Let zSj be the optimal choice in f(S ∪ {j}) and z
T
j be the one in
f(T ∪ {j}). Note that zSj ≥ z
T
j . Now assume that for f
′(S ∪ {j}), we only allow to assign at most zTj
to gj . Then f
′(S ∪ {j}) ≤ f(S ∪ {j}), since in the former a mass of zSj − z
T
j yields a smaller growth
in value due assignment to i 6= j with a smaller slope. When shifting from f(S) to f ′(S ∪ {j}) and
from f(T ) to f(T ∪ {j}), in both cases the increase at j is gj(z
′
j), and a mass of z
T
j is removed from the
remaining functions. This has a stronger effect in T , since the removal occurs at a higher slope. Overall,
f(T ∪ {j}) − f(T ) ≤ f ′(S ∪ {j}) − f(S) ≤ f(S ∪ {j}) − f(S).
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By Lemma 1 we can assume that the optimal scheme ϕ∗ directly recommends a set K of k actions.
Lemma 6. For every k ≥ 2, ActionsGreedy computes a subset S of k − 1 actions such that
f(S) ≥
(
1−
(
1−
1
k
)k−1)
· uS(ϕ
∗) .
Proof. ActionsGreedy is a standard greedy algorithm for submodular maximization. Note that
uS(ϕ
∗) ≤ uS(ϕ
∗
K∪{n}) ≤ f(K) ≤ f(S
∗
k) ,
where S∗k ∈ argmax{f(S) | S ⊆ [n − 1], |S| = k}. The action n is apriori receiver-optimal, and in our
scheme below it will play the role of an outside option, a baseline or dummy signal (c.f. [11, 21]). However,
it is not necessarily part of the optimal subset K of signals. As such, we overestimate the optimal value
by f(S∗k), the best set of k + 1 recommended actions, one of which must be action n.
A simple generalization of the standard analysis in [30] (see, e.g., [27, Theorem 1.5]) shows that for
this case the greedy solution S guarantees f(S) ≥ (1− (1− 1/k)k−1) · f(S∗k), and the lemma follows.
Now consider the second step of ϕIS , i.e., the computation of a signal using ComputeSignal.
Lemma 7. For every k ≥ 2, let S ∪ {n} be any set of k actions. Given the set S ∪ {n} of actions,
ComputeSignal computes a signaling scheme ϕ such that
uS(ϕ) ≥
(
1−
(
1−
1
k
)k)
· f(S) .
Proof. Given the chosen set S of actions, we consider these actions one-by-one in non-decreasing order
of gi(z
∗
i )/z
∗
i . ComputeSignal flips an independent coin for each action whether or not to recommend it.
We perform several bounding steps to provide a lower bound on uS(ϕ). First, we assume that the final
“backup signal” for action n in the last line 6 has value 0 for S. We use pℓ =
∏ℓ−1
ℓ′=1(1− z
∗
ℓ′) to denote the
probability to arrive in iteration ℓ > 1 in the for-loop. Conditioned on arriving in iteration ℓ, the combined
probability of action iℓ having state j and issuing a recommendation is qiℓ,j ·
x∗iℓ,j
qiℓ,j
= x∗iℓ,j. Thus, conditioned
on arriving in iteration ℓ, the expected value for S from this iteration is
∑m
j=1 x
∗
iℓ
ξiℓ,j = giℓ(z
∗
iℓ
). Overall,
uS(ϕ)
f(S)
≥
k∑
ℓ=1
giℓ(z
∗
iℓ
) · pℓ
k∑
ℓ=1
giℓ(z
∗
iℓ
)
=
k∑
ℓ=1
uiℓ · z
∗
iℓ
· pℓ
k∑
ℓ=1
uiℓ · z
∗
iℓ
, (4)
where we use the notation uiℓ = giℓ(z
∗
iℓ
)/z∗iℓ . Note that if z = 0, then giℓ(z) = 0. More generally, if there
is an action iℓ ∈ S with giℓ(z
∗
iℓ
) = 0, then we can drop it from consideration and consider the ratio with
the k − 1 remaining actions. Hence, we can assume that uiℓ > 0, for all 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k. By scaling the terms,
we obtain uik = 1 without changing the ratio. Note that the last ratio in (4) is a weighted mediant, where
the terms uiℓ , 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, act as weights for the ratios
z∗i1
z∗i1
>
z∗i2p1
z∗i2
> . . . >
z∗ikpk
z∗ik
.
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Repeated application of the generalized mediant inequality shows that when ui1 ≥ . . . ≥ uik = 1, the
ratio is minimized for ui1 = . . . = uik = 1, i.e.,
uS(ϕ)
f(S)
≥
k∑
ℓ=1
uiℓ · z
∗
iℓ
· pℓ
k∑
ℓ=1
uiℓ · z
∗
iℓ
≥
k∑
ℓ=1
z∗iℓ · pℓ
k∑
ℓ=1
z∗iℓ
=
k∑
ℓ=1
z∗iℓ · pℓ = 1−
(
k−1∑
i=1
z∗iℓ
)
k−1∏
i=1
(1− z∗iℓ)
≥ 1−
k − 1
k
(
1−
1
k
)k−1
= 1−
(
1−
1
k
)k
.
For the second line, observe that the last function in the first line is symmetric and convex in every
variable z∗iℓ . As such, it has a global minimum at z
∗
i1
= . . . = z∗ik = 1/k.
Combining the previous lemmas allows to bound the approximation ratio. We proceed to show
persuasiveness of the scheme.
Lemma 8. ComputeSignal returns a direct and persuasive signaling scheme for independent instances
with k signals.
Proof. Note that ComputeSignal solves LP (2) to optimality. Hence, due to the first constraint of LP (3)
we have
∑m
j=1 xij ≤ zi for every i ∈ S ∪ {n}. We first argue that we can w.l.o.g. assume that this
constraint holds with equality.
Every LP (3) is a parametric linear program. Increasing scalar z increases the right-hand side of the
first packing constraint. It is easy to see that gi(0) = 0. Standard sensitivity analysis for parametric
linear programs implies that gi(z) is non-decreasing, piece-wise linear, and concave. Hence, an optimal
assignment z∗ in (2) results from a waterfilling approach, where we raise the entries z∗i until they sum
up to 1, while keeping a common slope for all functions gi for i ∈ S ∪ {n} (w.l.o.g. we assume that a
breakpoint between linear segments in gi represents all intermediate slopes). For every i ∈ [n− 1], there
exists at most one breakpoint zˆi ∈ [0, 1] such that the slope of gi(z) is 0 for all zˆi ≤ z ≤ 1. If no such
breakpoint exists, we can set zˆi = 1. W.l.o.g. we assume 0 ≤ z
∗
i ≤ zˆi and z
∗
n ≥ 0 such that
∑n
i=1 zi = 1.
Observe that for every zn ∈ [0, 1] we can assume the first constraint in LP (3) holds with tightness without
violating the second constraint with ̺E . As a consequence, we can assume w.l.o.g. for every i ∈ [n] that in
the optimal solution z∗ of (2) the first constraint of every LP (3) is satisfied with equality
∑m
j=1 x
∗
ij = z
∗
i .
Using this insight, we prove persuasiveness. In particular, for every choice of the set S of actions with
S ⊆ [n− 1] with |S| = k − 1, we show that ComputeSignal computes a direct and persuasive signal.
For each action i ∈ S∪{n} ComputeSignal observes the type realization and uses the optimal solution
x∗ for LP (3) to flip an independent coin that yields the recommendation for action i. First, condition
on the event that the scheme returns the signal for action iℓ ∈ S in the last for-loop. We again use
pℓ =
∏ℓ−1
ℓ′=1(1− z
∗
iℓ′
) to denote the probability that the scheme arrives in iteration ℓ. Due to independent
coin flips in the for-loop, the probability that the signal is sent in iteration ℓ is
∑m
j=1 qiℓ,j ·x
∗
iℓ,j
/qiℓ,j = z
∗
iℓ
,
where we assume the equality z∗i =
∑m
j=1 x
∗
ij as observed above. A signal for action iℓ 6= n yields a
conditional expected utility for R of
1
pℓ · z
∗
iℓ
· pℓ ·
m∑
j=1
qiℓ,j · (x
∗
iℓ,j
/qiℓ,j) · ̺iℓ,j =
1
z∗iℓ
m∑
j=1
x∗iℓ,j̺iℓ,j ≥ ̺E ,
where the inequality follows the second constraint in (3).
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Now suppose ComputeSignal signals action n. First, suppose the signal results from the last line of
the scheme. Then all coins in other iterations ℓ′ 6= ℓ with iℓ′ 6= n have not come up heads, which has
probability p−ℓ =
∏
ℓ′ 6=ℓ(1 − z
∗
iℓ′
). In addition, the signal in iteration ℓ with iℓ = n must not be sent. R
obtains an expected utility of
p−ℓ ·
m∑
j=1
qn,j ·
(
1− x∗nj/qn,j
)
· ̺nj = p−ℓ ·

̺E − m∑
j=1
x∗nj̺nj

 .
Second, assume the signal results from iteration ℓ of the for-loop, then the expected utility is
pℓ ·
m∑
j=1
qiℓ,j · (x
∗
iℓ,j
/qiℓ,j) · ̺iℓ,j = pℓ
m∑
j=1
x∗iℓ,j̺iℓ,j .
A signal for action n yields a conditional expected utility for R of
pℓ
m∑
j=1
x∗nj̺nj + p−ℓ

̺E − m∑
j=1
x∗nj̺nj


pℓ · z∗n + p−ℓ · (1− z
∗
n)
=
p−ℓ · ̺E + (pℓ − p−ℓ)
m∑
j=1
x∗nj̺nj
p−ℓ + (pℓ − p−ℓ) · z∗n
≥
̺E · (p−ℓ + (pℓ − p−ℓ) · z
∗
n)
p−ℓ + (pℓ − p−ℓ) · z∗n
= ̺E ,
where the inequality follows from the equality z∗i =
∑m
j=1 x
∗
ij and the second constraint in (3).
Hence, for every recommended action, the expected value for R is at least ̺E . Thus, deviating to
any action i 6∈ S ∪ {n} is not profitable for R, since the type of action i is independent of the signal, and
every action a priori has expected value at most ̺E for R.
We condition on the case that ComputeSignal sends a signal for action iℓ 6= n in the for-loop. The
expected value of action iℓ′ with ℓ
′ > ℓ is at most ̺E, since the type of action iℓ′ has not been observed.
For ℓ′ < ℓ, the scheme decided not to send a signal using an independent coin flip in iteration ℓ′. The
overall value of action iℓ′ for R is most ̺E , the value of a signal is at least ̺E, so a non-signal for action
iℓ′ has value at most ̺E for R. Similar arguments show that conditioned on a signal for action n, every
other action has expected value at most ̺E . This proves that the resulting scheme is persuasive.
In terms of running time, GreedyActions solves (2) an O(nk) number of times. ComputeSignal
solves (2) only once, and then computes at most k − 1 independent coin flips. Clearly, both algorithms
can be implemented to run in time polynomial in the representation of the input. This concludes the
proof of Theorem 3.
4.2 Improved Approximation and Tightness
In this section, we improve the approximation ratio of the scheme from the previous section. It is easy
to see that Lemma 7 is tight – there are cases2 in which the sender utility of any persuasive scheme for
action set S ∪ {n} can indeed recover at most a fraction of 1− (1− 1/k)k of f(S).
Instead, we replace the standard greedy algorithm for submodular maximization by a more elaborate
procedure to carefully choose a subset of actions. In this section, we describe an FPTAS to compute, for
2Consider a set S ∪ {n} consisting of k IID actions. Every action i ∈ S ∪ {n} has two possible types Θi = {θ1, θ0},
where (̺(θ1), ξ(θ1)) = (1, 1), qθ1 = 1/k, and (̺(θ0), ξ(θ0)) = (0, 0). Observe that f(S) = 1. The best persuasive scheme
recommends an action with type θ1 whenever there is one, which happens only with probability 1− (1− 1/k)
k.
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every given constant ε > 0, a set S ⊆ [n− 1] of k − 1 actions such that f(S) ≥ (1− ε) · f(S∗) for the set
S∗ ⊆ [n− 1] of k − 1 actions that maximizes f .
Our approach in the algorithm described below is to use a discretized version fˆ of function f . In
fˆ(S) we restrict the possible values for zi, for every action i ∈ [n], to zi ∈ {0, τ, 2τ, 3τ, . . . , 1}, where
τ = 1/⌈k/δ⌉. This restriction decreases the optimal value by at most a factor of δ, i.e., fˆ(S) ≥ (1−δ)f(S)
for every subset S ⊆ [n− 1]. We then construct a knapsack-style FPTAS to find, for any constant δ > 0,
a subset S such that fˆ(S) ≥ (1− δ)fˆ(S∗) ≥ (1− δ)2f(S∗) in polynomial time, where S∗ ⊆ [n− 1] is the
set of k − 1 actions maximizing f . Using δ = ε/2 then yields fˆ(S) ≥ (1 − ε)f(S∗). By submodularity,
f(S∗) ≥ k−1
k
· f(S∗k), and, hence, f(S
∗) ≥ k−1
k
· f(K) ≥ k−1
k
· uS(ϕ
∗).
The following proposition summarizes the main insight from this section.
Proposition 2. For every k ≥ 2 and every constant ε > 0, there is a polynomial-time algorithm to
compute a subset S of k − 1 actions such that
f(S) ≥ (1− ε) ·
(
1−
1
k
)
· uS(ϕ
∗) .
Combining the algorithm for selection of S with ComputeSignal, we obtain a signaling scheme that we
term the Improved Independent Scheme. Proposition 2 together with Lemmas 7 and 8 imply Theorem 4.
Let us now describe the algorithm and the guarantee in Proposition 2 in more detail. We first apply
a discretization, for which we need to solve LP (3) a total of at most O(nk/ε) times. The subsequent
FPTAS procedure needs O(n2k6/ε3) time which, arguably, seems rather high. Our goal here was to
simplify the exposition and the analysis of the FPTAS as much as possible. It is an interesting direction
for future work to improve the running time in terms of the dependence on k and ε.
Discretization For approximating f , we consider approximating the function fˆ . The definition of fˆ is
the same as for f in (2), where we add a discretization constraint that zi ∈ {0, τ, 2τ, 3τ, . . . ,
τ−1
τ
, 1} with
τ = 1/⌈k/δ⌉.
Lemma 9. Consider the subset S∗ ⊆ [n− 1] that maximizes f(S∗). It holds that fˆ(S∗) ≥ (1− δ)f(S∗).
Proof. Since (2) is a packing problem, we can assume w.l.o.g. that |S∗| = k − 1. We denote by z∗
the optimal solution for f(S∗) in (2). For z′i = (1 − δ)z
∗
i , concavity and monotonicity of gi implies
gi(z
′
i) ≥ (1 − δ)gi(z
∗
i ) for every i ∈ S
∗ ∪ {n}. Observe that
∑
i∈S∗∪{n} z
′
i ≤ (1 − δ) since z
∗ is a feasible
solution. We round z′i up to the next multiple of τ , i.e., zˆi = τ · ⌈
z′i
τ
⌉. Then
∑
i∈S∗∪{n}
zˆi ≤
∑
i∈S∗∪{n}
z′i + τ ≤ (1− δ) + k ·
1
⌈k/δ⌉
≤ 1 .
Now zˆ is a feasible solution for the optimization problem of fˆ(S), so
fˆ(S) ≥
∑
i∈S∗∪{n}
gi(zˆi) ≥
∑
i∈S∗∪{n}
gi(z
′
i) ≥ (1− δ)
∑
i∈S∗∪{n}
gi(z
∗
i ) = (1− δ)f(S
∗) .
We rephrase the optimization problem of fˆ(S) as having 1/τ many particles that can be assigned to
the actions S ∪ {n}. The ℓ-th particle assigned to action i has marginal profit mℓi = gi(ℓτ)− gi((ℓ− 1)τ).
For every action i, the marginal profit of the ℓ-th assigned particle is mℓi ≥ 0 and m
ℓ+1
i ≤ m
ℓ
i , for all
ℓ ≥ 1. Clearly, the optimal solution for fˆ(S) can be computed by a simple greedy algorithm: Assign
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the 1/τ particles to actions S ∪ {n} in non-increasing order of marginal profit. Consider the set Sˆ∗ that
optimizes fˆ(S) over all subsets S of size at most k − 1. Let m∗ be the profit of the last particle assigned
by the greedy algorithm to any action in Sˆ∗ ∪ {n}.
Our main idea in the FPTAS is to guess m∗. Put differently, we run the algorithm discussed in the
following for all marginal profits from all particles of all functions gi, i ∈ [n]. Since only 1/τ particles
must be considered for any action, we have at most n/τ = O(nk/δ) calls to the algorithm. For the rest
of this section, we outline our approach for a given marginal profit value m.
Given a value m, consider an action i. We denote by ℓi(m) the largest number of a particle with
marginal profit strictly larger than m. Suppose that i ∈ Sˆ∗ and m = m∗. Then in fˆ(Sˆ∗) we will
assign at least zi ≥ τℓi(m) to action i. With foresight, we use the notation w
r
i (m) = τ · ℓi(m) and
pri (m) = gi(τℓi(m)). Suppose i has particles ℓi(m) + 1, ℓi(m) + 2, . . . , ℓi(m) + ti(m) with marginal profit
m, then fˆ assigns a mass of zi ∈ [τℓi(m), τ(ℓi(m) + ti(m))]. We use the notation w
o
i (m) = τ · ti(m)
and poi (m) = m · τ · ti(m) = m · w
o
i (m). Otherwise, if gi has no particle with marginal profit m, then
zi = τℓi(m), and we set w
o
i (m) = p
o
i (m) = 0. With this notation, we can express fˆ(Sˆ
∗) by
fˆ(Sˆ∗) =
∑
i∈Sˆ∗∪{n}
gi(τℓi(m
∗)) +m∗ ·
∑
i∈Sˆ∗∪{n}
(zi − τℓi(m
∗))
=
∑
i∈Sˆ∗∪{n}
pri (m
∗) +m∗ ·

1− ∑
i∈Sˆ∗∪{n}
wri (m
∗)

 .
fˆ distributes a total of 1/τ particles to Sˆ∗ such that for all functions gi, i ∈ Sˆ
∗ ∪ {n} we exhaust all
particles from these functions with marginal profit strictly larger than m∗. The remaining particles
achieve a marginal profit of exactly m∗. This implies, in particular, that
0 ≤ 1−
∑
i∈Sˆ∗∪{n}
wri (m
∗) ≤
∑
i∈Sˆ∗∪{n}
woi (m
∗) . (5)
Knapsack Problem Consider the following integer optimization problem for a given marginal profit
value m. We strive to find a subset S of at most k − 1 actions such that 1/τ particles can be assigned
with a marginal profit of at least m from actions i ∈ S ∪ {n} to maximize the resulting total profit.
h(m) = Max.
n∑
i=1
yip
r
i (m) + min
(
m−m
n∑
i=1
yiw
r
i (m),
n∑
i=1
yip
o
i (m)
)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
yiw
r
i (m) ≤ 1
n−1∑
i=1
yi ≤ k − 1
yn = 1
yi ∈ {0, 1}
(6)
For given m, we denote the optimal solution for h(m) by y∗ and the action set optimizing h(m) by
S∗m = {i | y
∗
i = 1, i 6= n}.
Lemma 10. For every marginal profit m, the following holds:
(a) If h(m) is feasible, then h(m) ≤ fˆ(Sˆ∗).
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(b) If m = m∗, then h(m∗) is feasible and h(m∗) = fˆ(Sˆ∗).
(c) If h(m) is infeasible, then m 6= m∗.
Proof. In h we sum the value from each action i ∈ S∗s for the required assignment of particles to arrive
at marginal profit m, and then use the remaining particles to generate additional value at a rate of m.
Consider any marginal profit m and a feasible solution y for h(m) with action set S = {i | yi = 1, i 6= n}.
If S satisfies (5), then h(m) = fˆ(S), since h correctly captures the greedy algorithm to assign particles
to gi in non-increasing order of marginal profit. However, there might be values m and solutions y, such
that for the corresponding set S ∪ {n} of actions it is impossible to find a total of 1/τ particles with
marginal profit at least m. Clearly, if this happens, then∑
i∈S∪{n}
wri (m) +
∑
i∈S∪{n}
woi (m) < 1
This implies, in particular, that either m 6= m∗ or S 6= Sˆ∗, since otherwise we would violate (5). Moreover,
in h the set S only yields a value of
∑
i∈S∪{n}
pri (m) + min

m−m n∑
i=1
wri (m),
∑
i∈S∪{n}
poi (m)

 = ∑
i∈S∪{n}
pri (m) +
∑
i∈S∪{n}
poi (m) ,
i.e., it only sums up the value generated by particles with marginal profit at least m. In contrast, in
fˆ(S) we would continue the greedy algorithm and assign particles beyond the ones with marginal profit
at least m. This holds in particular for S = S∗m, so h(m) ≤ fˆ(S
∗
m). Since fˆ(S
∗
m) ≤ fˆ(Sˆ
∗), this proves (b).
It is straightforward to verify that for m∗ and the optimal set Sˆ∗ the conditions in (5) guarantee that
h(m∗) is feasible. Moreover, (5) implies that in the objective function
min

m∗ −m∗ ∑
i∈Sˆ∗∪{n}
wri (m
∗),
∑
i∈Sˆ∗∪{n}
poi (m
∗)

 = m∗

1− ∑
i∈Sˆ∗∪{n}
wri (m
∗)

 .
This implies that h(m∗) = f(Sˆ∗), and (a) follows.
If h(m) is infeasible, then for every subset S ⊆ [n− 1] with |S| ≤ k − 1 actions we have∑
i∈S∪{n}
wri (m) > 1 .
Then m 6= m∗ since (5) is violated. This proves (c).
Dynamic Program As a consequence of Lemma 10, in order to compute an approximation to fˆ(Sˆ∗)
we focus on approximating h(m) in (6) for every given value m. For convenience, we use a knapsack
terminology. There is an required item for action i with size wri (m) and profit p
r
i (m). In addition, there
is an optional item with size woi (m) and profit p
o
i (m). The constraints in (6) (with the exception of the
trivial constraint yn = 1) exactly represent the constraint set of the 1.5-dimensional knapsack problem [25,
Section 9.7].
The objective function can be interpreted as follows. Upon packing a required item of action i into
the knapsack, we also allow to fill the remaining space in the knapsack with (any fraction of) the optional
item of i. Note that all optional items correspond to particles with marginal profit m. Optional items
can be removed to free space for required items of other actions. Since required items correspond to
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particles with marginal profit larger than m, they generate more value per unit of size they occupy in the
knapsack. Hence, adding required items (as long as the constraint set allows it) and removing (parts of)
optional ones is always desirable.
For every given m, we now describe an FPTAS to approximate the optimal solution of (6) by (1−δ) in
polynomial time, for every constant δ > 0. The approach resembles the standard dynamic programming
approach for the knapsack problem. We assume w.l.o.g. that all required items fit into the knapsack, i.e.,
wri (m) ≤ 1 for all i ∈ [n− 1], since otherwise we can drop the action from consideration.
Consider pmax(m) = max{p
r
i (m),min(m, p
o
i (m)) | i ∈ [n]}, and assume κ =
δ·pmax(m)
2k . We consider
the adjusted profits p¯ri = ⌊p
r
i (m)/κ⌋ and p¯
o
i = ⌊p
o
i (m)/κ⌋. Our dynamic programming table is given by
A(i, j, p¯r , p¯o) with the interpretation that for this entry we consider a subset of solutions of the following
form: (1) the packed required items are from actions {1, . . . , i, n}, (2) we pack the required items of
action n and exactly j of the remaining actions, (3) the packed required items have a total adjusted profit
of p¯r, (4) the adjusted profit of optional items corresponding to packed required items sums to p¯o. For
each entry A(i, j, p¯r, p¯o) we store the minimum total size of required items of any solution that fulfills
the conditions of this entry. The number of possible table entries is O(n · k5/δ2), which is a polynomial
number in n and k. We initialize all entries with ∞. Then the base cases of the recursion are
A(0, 0, p¯rn, p¯
o
n) = w
r
n, and
A(0, 0, x, y) =∞ for every x, y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k · ⌊k/δ⌋}, (x, y) 6= (p¯rn, p¯
o
n).
We fill the table in increasing order of the parameters by setting
A(i, j, p¯r , p¯o) = min{A(i − 1, j, p¯r, p¯o), wri +A(i− 1, j − 1, p¯
r − p¯ri , p¯
o − p¯oi )} ,
where we assume the entry is ∞ whenever the arguments become negative. Clearly, this recursion allows
to fill the table in time linear in the size of the table. As in the standard knapsack problem, the recursion
simply distinguishes between packing the required item of action i into the knapsack or not.
The rationale behind this approach is as follows. Consider the set of solutions represented by
A(i, j, p¯r , p¯o). Clearly when we have p¯r adjusted profit from packed required items and a potential ad-
justed profit of p¯o from optional items, the best solution is one that minimizes the size of packed required
items to allow for a maximum portion of optional items to be included into the knapsack.
After completing the table, we consider all entries with A(i, j, p¯r, p¯o) ≤ 1, since these entries correspond
to a feasible solution. From each of these entries, we pick the one that maximizes the adjusted profit
κ · p¯r +min(m−m ·A(i, j, p¯r , p¯o), κ · p¯o).
Approximation Ratio Consider the adjusted profit of the optimal solution S∗m, which is
∑
i∈S∗m∪{n}
κp¯ri +min

m−m · ∑
i∈S∗m∪{n}
wri ,
∑
i∈S∗m∪{n}
κp¯oi

 ≥ h(m) − 2kκ = h(m)− δpmax
If pmax is attained for a profit of a required item p
r
i , then consider packing only the required item i.
This is a feasible solution since wri ≤ 1. Otherwise, suppose pmax is attained for an entry min(m, p
o
i (m)).
We use min(m, poi (m)) in the definition of pmax, since the optional item is not assumed to fit into the
knapsack completely, and m · 1 is the profit of a knapsack filled completely with any set of (parts of)
optional items. Now suppose we pack only the optional item of i (or parts of it until the knapsack is
full). Then pack the required item of i, thereby possibly replacing parts of the optional item. This is
a feasible solution since wri (m) ≤ 1. The replacement increases the profit over min(m, p
o
i (m)). Overall,
these observations imply h(m) ≥ pmax.
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The dynamic program computes a solution S′ with the best adjusted profit. The profit of S′ is more
than the adjusted profit, which is more than the adjusted profit of S∗m, which is more than h(m)− δpmax.
Since h(m) ≥ pmax, the profit of S
′ is at least (1− δ) · h(m).
Since we run the dynamic program for all marginal profits of particles, the best solution S that is
found overall has value f(S) ≥ fˆ(S) ≥ (1 − δ)h(m∗) = (1− δ)fˆ (Sˆ∗) ≥ (1− δ)2f(S∗) = (1− ε)f(S∗) due
to Lemmas 9 and 10.
5 Approximation by Restricted Signals
Let OPTk denote the expected sender utility of the optimal scheme with k signals. We quantify the
performance loss against a case when the sender has (at least) n signals available and achieves OPTn.
5.1 Symmetric Instances
We define the Imitation Scheme ϕImi for any symmetric instance with n actions and k signals. It first
runs an optimal symmetric scheme ϕ∗n for n signals. Let i be the action chosen by ϕ
∗
n. If i ∈ [k], we signal
action i; otherwise, we signal any action chosen uniformly at random from [k].
The running time of ϕImi is determined by the running time to implement an optimal symmetric
scheme for n signals. In particular, such a scheme can be computed with the Slope-Algorithm, so an
efficient probability oracle is sufficient for polynomial running time of ϕImi. We now show that ϕImi
provides a tight approximation ratio in terms of OPTn.
Proposition 3. The Imitation Scheme is symmetric, direct, and persuasive in symmetric instances.
For every k ≥ 2 it holds uS(ϕImi) ≥ k/n · OPTn. There exists a random-order instance such that
OPTk ≤ k/n ·OPTn.
Proof. We first prove the result for the Imitation Scheme. The optimal scheme ϕ∗n is symmetric. If ϕImi
deviates from the recommendation of ϕ∗n, it recommends a uniform random action in [k]. Hence, ϕImi is
also symmetric.
Conditioned on action i being recommended by ϕImi, the type distribution of action i is Dyes from ϕ
∗
n
with probability k/n or Dno from ϕ
∗
n with probability (n−k)/n. If an action i ∈ [k] is not recommended,
the type distribution is Dno from ϕ
∗
n, no matter which action j ∈ [k] is recommended. Let ̺yes and ̺no
be the expected utility of R in Dyes and Dno from ϕ
∗
n, respectively. In ϕImi, the expected utility for R
for any given action i ∈ [k] must satisfy
1
k
(
k
n
· ̺yes +
n− k
n
· ̺no
)
+
k − 1
k
· ̺no = ̺E .
Since ̺no ≤ ̺E , the expected utility for R when following a recommended action in ϕImi can be bounded
by k
n
· ̺yes +
n−k
n
· ̺no ≥ ̺E. By Lemma 3 we see that ϕImi is persuasive.
The optimal scheme ϕ∗n is symmetric and recommends each action with probability 1/n. With prob-
ability k/n, ϕImi recommends the same action as ϕ
∗
n, so uS(ϕImi) ≥ k/n ·OPTn.
For the upper bound on OPTk, we consider an instance from the random-order scenario. There are
n types. θ1 has utility pair (1,1), all n− 1 remaining types have utility pair (0, 0). Obviously, OPTn = 1,
the sender gives a signal for the action with type 1. With k signals, there is an optimal scheme that
recommends only the first k actions. With probability k/n, type 1 is among those k actions. Otherwise,
type 1 cannot be recommended. Hence, OPTk ≤ k/n, which completes the proof.
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Algorithm 4: ActionsReduce
Input: Type sets Θ1, . . . ,Θn and distributions q1, . . . , qn, s.t.
∑
j qn,j̺nj = ̺E and∑
j qn,jξnj = maxi∈[n] :
∑
j qi,j̺ij=̺E
∑
j qi,jξij , parameter 2 ≤ k ≤ n
1 Compute f([n− 1]).
2 For every i ∈ [n], let z∗i be the values of the optimal solution in f([n− 1]).
3 Let S be the set of the k − 1 actions from [n− 1] with largest values gi(z
∗
i ).
4 return S
5.2 Independent Instances
The first lemma shows that there are independent (and symmetric) instances such that the best approx-
imation ratio is in O(k/n).
Lemma 11. There exists an IID instance such that OPTk ≤
e
e−1 · k/n ·OPTn.
Proof. In the distribution for every action there is a good type θ1 with utility pair (1, 1) and qθ1 = 1/n,
and a bad type θ0 with utility pair (0, 0) and qθ0 = 1− 1/n. Clearly, the optimal mechanism is to signal
an action with θ1 whenever it exists (within the first k actions). This yields a ratio of
OPTk
OPTn
=
1−
(
1− 1
n
)k
1−
(
1− 1
n
)n = k/n −
∑k
i=2
(
k
i
) (
−1
n
)i
1−
∑n
i=2
(
n
i
) (
−1
n
)i
This ratio is at most e/(e−1) ·k/n, for all k ∈ {2, . . . , n}, where e/(e−1) ≈ 1.58. To see this, observe
OPTk ≥
k
k + 1
·OPTk+1
since the left-hand side is a lower bound on the sender utility when using ϕImi for k signals based on the
optimal IID-scheme for k + 1 signals. Hence,
OPTk
k
≥
OPTk+1
k + 1
Therefore, for all k = 2, . . . , n we have OPTk /k ≤ OPT1 /1 = OPT1 = 1/n, i.e.,
OPTk
OPTn
/k
n
=
n
OPTn
·
OPTk
k
≤
1
OPTn
=
1
1−
(
1− 1
n
)n .
The factor is monotone in n and grows to 1/(1− 1/e) = e/(e − 1).
To provide an asymptotically tight bound of Ω(k/n), we consider the Independent-Imitation Scheme.
Similar to the schemes in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 above, it consists of the two steps of (a) choosing a suitable
subset of actions and (b) computing a good direct signaling scheme for the chosen subset of actions. In
the Independent-Imitation Scheme we use ActionsReduce (Algorithm 4) for step (a), and ComputeSignal
(Algorithm 3) for step (b) as above. Since the main computational step in both algorithms is to solve a
single linear program, the scheme can be implemented in polynomial time.
Theorem 5. The Independent-Imitation Scheme is direct and persuasive for independent instances with
k signals. It can be implemented in time polynomial in the input size. For every k ≥ 2,
uS(ϕImiIS) ≥
(
1−
(
1−
1
k
)k)
·
(
1−
1
k
)
·
k
n
·OPTn .
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Proof. Following (2) above we observed that f(S) ≥ uS(ϕ
∗
S∪{n}), so in particular f([n − 1]) ≥ OPTn.
For every action i ∈ [n − 1] and every type j ∈ Θi, let z
∗
i and x
∗
ij be the values of the optimal LP
solution for f([n− 1]). It is straightforward to verify that for every subset S, the values (z∗i )i∈S∪{n} and
(x∗ij)i∈S∪{n},j∈Θi constitute a feasible solution for the LP when optimizing f(S). Since ActionsReduce
chooses S to contain the k − 1 actions with largest gi(z
∗
i ),
f(S) ≥
∑
i∈S∪{n}
gi(z
∗
i ) ≥
k − 1
n
· f([n− 1]) ≥
(
1−
1
k
)
·
k
n
·OPTn
The approximation ratio now follows using Lemma 7. By Lemma 8, the resulting signaling scheme is
direct and persuasive.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The first statement follows from a simple revelation-principle-style argument. Consider any sig-
naling scheme ϕ. Given any signal σ, we can assume R chooses one action that maximizes the conditional
expectation of her utility. Suppose for two signals σ, σ′, R chooses the same action. Then S can simply
drop σ′ and issue σ every time it issued σ′, thereby achieving the same behavior of R. Thus, each of the k
signals can be assumed to correspond to a distinct choice of action of R, which maximizes the conditional
expectation of the utility of R. Hence, we can equivalently assume that S uses the signal to issue a direct
recommendation for an action such that R wants to follow the recommendation.
For the second statement, symmetry in the instance allows to restrict attention to the first k actions.
Consider an optimal direct and persuasive scheme ϕ that recommends actions from a size-k-subset K ⊆
[n]. Permute the labels of all actions in ϕ (and w.l.o.g. tie-breaking rule of R) such that it recommends
actions from [k]. Denote the permuted ϕ by ϕ′. Since the distribution over states of nature is symmetric, it
is invariant to permutation of action labels. Hence, applying ϕ′ yields the same conditional expectations
for the utility of R for the actions in [k] as ϕ yields for K. Thus, ϕ′ is direct and persuasive with
recommendations from [k] and uS(ϕ) = uS(ϕ
′).
B Efficient Probability Oracles
We divide the proof of Theorem 2 into two subsections for the prophet-secretary and the d-random-order
scenarios.
B.1 Prophet-Secretary
Consider the prophet-secretary scenario, in which we have n probability distributions over type spaces
Θ1, . . . ,Θn, respectively. For simplicity, we reverse the generation process of the state of nature θ: First,
permute the n distributions in uniform random order, then draw a single type from each distribution
independently.
We denote by qiθ the probability that type θ ∈ Θ
i is drawn from distribution i. For the n type spaces,
we assume w.l.o.g. that they are mutually disjoint. In addition, we assume for simplicity that types are
in general position, i.e., there are no more than two distinct types on any given straight line. We discuss
in the end how our observations can be adapted when this assumption does not hold.
Overall, the representation size of the input is at least linear in n, maxi |Θ
i|, and maxi,θ log 1/q
i
θ. For
a polynomial-time probability oracle, we have to implement two classes of queries in time polynomial in
the aforementioned quantities:
a) Given a pair of types a and b, return the probability pab that ab is in the Pareto-frontier of the type
set C of the first k actions.
b) Given a type c and a slope s, return the probability p
(s)
c that c is the unique point that corresponds
to slope s on the Pareto-frontier of the type set C of the first k actions.
Class a) If the two types are from the same distribution, then pab = 0. Otherwise, let ia and ib be such
that a ∈ Θia and b ∈ Θib . For each distribution i 6= ia, ib we consider every type c ∈ Θ
i. If c lies above
the line through a and b and is included in C, then c lifts the Pareto frontier above ab, and the segment
would vanish from the Pareto-frontier. Thus, if c lies above the line through a and b, then c must not be
in C. Otherwise, c is an allowed type. We denote by Θiab the set of allowed types of distribution i, and
by qiab =
∑
c∈Θi
ab
qic the probability to draw an allowed type in distribution i. Clearly, these probabilities
can be determined in time linear in the total number of types.
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Now in order to have ab on the Pareto-frontier, it must be the case that (1) distributions ia and ib are
permuted to the first k actions, (2) a and b are drawn from distributions ia and ib, respectively, and (3)
for every other distribution i permuted to the first k actions, we draw an allowed type. The probability
for (1) is k
n
· k−1
n−1 , the probability for (2) is q
ia
a · q
ib
b . To compute the probability of (3), we consider every
subset A ⊆ {1, . . . , n} \ {ia, ib} of |A| = k − 2 distributions and compute the probability that from every
distribution of A we draw an allowed type. Overall,
pab =
k
n
·
k − 1
n− 1
· qiaa · q
ib
b ·
1(
n−2
k−2
) · ∑
A⊆{1,...,n}\{ia,ib}
|A|=k−2
∏
i∈A
qiab .
To compute the last term, we need to compute the sum of products of all (k − 2)-size subsets of n − 2
numbers. This can done in time O(nk) using a dynamic program.
Class b) Let ic be such that c ∈ Θ
ic . For each distribution i 6= ic we again consider every type d ∈ Θ
i.
c shall be the unique point corresponding to slope s on the Pareto frontier, so there must not be any
type on or above the line going through c with slope s. Hence, all types that remain strictly below this
line are allowed types. We denote by Θic the set of allowed types of distribution i, and by q
i
c =
∑
d∈Θic
qid
the probability to draw an allowed type in distribution i. These probabilities can be determined in time
linear in the total number of types.
For c to be the unique point that corresponds to s on the Pareto-frontier, it must be the case that
(1) distribution ic is permuted to the first k actions, (2) c is drawn from distribution ic, and (3) for
every other distribution i permuted to the first k actions, we draw an allowed type. The probability
for (1) is k
n
, the probability for (2) is qicc . To compute the probability of (3), we consider every subset
A ⊆ {1, . . . , n}\{ic} of |A| = k−1 distributions and compute the probability that from every distribution
of A we draw an allowed type. Overall,
p(s)c =
k
n
· qicc ·
1(
n−1
k−1
) · ∑
A⊆{1,...,n}\{ic}
|A|=k−1
∏
i∈A
qic .
Again, the last term can be computed by a dynamic program in time O(nk).
On general position When types are not in general position, i.e., there are three or more types on a
straight line, the events of them forming a line segment on the Pareto frontier are not disjoint. Hence,
the probabilities to set up the LP have to be computed in a slightly different manner.
We ensure that a segment is not counted multiple times by considering, for any given slope, only the
longest possible line segment in the Pareto frontier. Hence, the following modification has to be made
for queries of class a) when determining the set of allowed types Θiab: All types of Θ
i that are on the
segment ab are allowed since this does not prohibit ab to be the longest possible line segment. All types
of Θi that are on the straight line going through a and b but not on ab must not be allowed. With this
modification to calculate the probabilities for pab, general position of types is no longer required.
The main insight in this section is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. For the prophet-secretary scenario we can implement a probability oracle for the Slope-
Algorithm in polynomial time.
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B.2 d-Random-Order
For d-random-order instances, we have d type vectors θ1, . . . ,θd and a distribution over these vectors. We
denote by qθi the probability of θ
i. Without loss of generality we assume that all dn types in the d vectors
are distinct. To generate a state of nature, we draw vector θi with probability qθi , and then permute the
vector uniformly at random. The representation size of the input is linear in dn and maxi log 1/qθi . For
a polynomial-time probability oracle, we again have to implement two classes of queries discussed in the
previous section. The running time will be polynomial in the aforementioned quantities. For simplicity,
we again assume types are points in general position.
Class a) If the two types a and b come from different vectors θj and θj
′
, then pab = 0. Otherwise,
suppose a and b are from θj. Consider each type c from θj with c 6= a, b. If c lies above the line through
a and b and is included in C, then c lifts the Pareto frontier above ab, and the segment would vanish from
the Pareto-frontier. Thus, if c lies above the line through a and b, then c must not be in C. Otherwise,
c is an allowed type. We denote by Ajab the set of allowed types from vector θ
j. Clearly, Ajab can be
computed in time linear in n.
Now in order to have ab on the Pareto-frontier, it must be the case that (1) θj is drawn from the
distribution, (2) a and b are permuted to the first k actions, and (3) every other type from θj permuted
to the first k actions is an allowed type. The probabilities for these events are (1) qθj , (2)
k
n
· k−1
n−1 , and
(3)
(|Aj
ab
|
k−2
)/(
n−2
k−2
)
, where we assume that
(|Aj
ab
|
k−2
)
= 0 if |Ajab| < k − 2. Overall,
pab = qθj ·
k
n
·
k − 1
n− 1
·
1(
n−2
k−2
) ·( |Ajab|
k − 2
)
.
Clearly, this expression can be computed in polynomial time for every pair of types a, b.
Class b) Let c be a type from vector θj. Consider each type d from θj with d 6= c. Type c shall be the
unique point corresponding to slope s on the Pareto frontier, so d must not be on or above the line going
through c with slope s. If d remains strictly below this line, it is an allowed type. We denote by Ajc the
set of allowed types from θj . Clearly, Ajc can be computed in time linear in n.
For c to be the unique point that corresponds to s on the Pareto-frontier, it must be the case that (1)
θj is drawn from the distribution, (2) c is permuted to the first k actions, and (3) every other type from
θj permuted to the first k actions is an allowed type. The probabilities for these events are (1) qθj , (2)
k
n
, and (3)
(|Ajc|
k−1
)/(
n−1
k−1
)
, where we assume that
(|Aj
ab
|
k−1
)
= 0 if |Ajab| < k − 1. Overall,
p(s)c = qθj ·
k
n
·
1(
n−1
k−1
) ·( |Ajc|
k − 1
)
.
Again, the expression can be computed in polynomial time for every type c.
The adjustments to remove the assumption of general position are the same as for prophet-secretary
in the previous section. The main insight in this section is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. For the d-random-order scenario we can implement a probability oracle for the Slope-
Algorithm in polynomial time.
C Bicriteria Approximation
For a symmetric instance with k signals and n actions, consider a truncation operation: Remove actions
k + 1, . . . , n from consideration and restrict every state of nature θ to its first k entries. This yields
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the truncated instance with k signals and k actions. Suppose we apply the characterization from Theo-
rem 1 and the Slope-Algorithm to compute an optimal scheme in the original instance and the truncated
instance. Indeed, it is a straightforward consequence of symmetry that the resulting scheme is the same.
Proposition 6. For symmetric instances with k signals and n actions, there is an optimal scheme that
is an optimal scheme for the truncated instance with k signals and k actions, and vice versa.
We show that one can apply algorithms to the truncated instance and obtain similar results for the
scenario with k < n actions. By truncating the instance, we return to the standard scenario of Bayesian
persuasion with n = k actions and signals.
In particular, for the IID scenario, truncation yields an instance where we draw from the same
underlying distribution simply for k instead of n actions. Hence, an optimal scheme with n IID actions
and k signals is an optimal scheme for k IID actions and k signals. Instead of using the Slope-Algorithm,
it can also be obtained by solving a single LP of polynomial size [13].
More generally, applying a Monte-Carlo sampling approach we obtain a bicriteria approximation when
having black-box access to the prior over states of nature. In the following, we assume that all utility
values are in ̺(θi), ξ(θi) ∈ [−1, 1]. We assume S has black-box oracle access to the prior, i.e., she can
draw states of nature as samples from the distribution.
Let ϕ∗ be an optimal direct and persuasive scheme. Given any parameter ε > 0, a direct scheme ϕ is
ε-persuasive if E [̺(θi) | σ = i] ≥ E [̺(θj) | σ = i]− ε for all actions j ∈ [n]. A direct scheme is ε-optimal
if uS(ϕ) ≥ uS(ϕ
∗)− ε, where for uS(ϕ) we assume that R follows the recommendation. An ε-persuasive
and ε-optimal scheme gives both players a guarantee that their expected utility is at most an (additive)
ε away from a utility benchmark. For R the benchmark is the utility of the best action given ϕ, for S it
is the utility obtained by an optimal persuasive scheme.
The main result of this section is that the bicriteria FPTAS from [13] can be applied to the truncated
instance.
Corollary 1. In symmetric instances with k ≤ n signals, utility values in [−1, 1], and black-box oracle
access to the distribution over states of nature, an ε-persuasive and ε-optimal scheme can be computed in
time polynomial in n and 1/ε, for every ε > 0.
Proof. We apply the bicriteria FPTAS from [13] to the truncated instance, which implies the result for
the truncated instance. We now argue that the guarantees of ε-optimal and ε-persuasive also apply in the
original instance. Since we observed above that there is a scheme that is optimal in both the truncated
and original instances, ε-optimality is immediate. It remains to show ε-persuasiveness.
In addition to the given state of nature, the scheme draws a polynomial number of independent
samples from the black-box oracle. It then computes the optimal direct and ε-persuasive scheme for the
uniform distribution over the sample set. This is done by solving an LP of polynomial size (see [13,
Section 5.1]). In the solution of the LP, we assume that all ties are broken uniformly at random. Then,
if we permute all states of nature in the sample in the same way, the resulting scheme also permutes
the signal distributions in the same way. Due to symmetry in the instance, every permutation is equally
likely. As a consequence, the resulting scheme is symmetric. We denote by ̺yes, ̺no, and ̺never the
expected utility for R for the distributions of recommended action, non-recommended action in [k], and
non-recommended action in [n] \ [k], respectively. Note that ̺never = ̺E . Due to symmetry, as in
Lemma 3, we have 1
k
· ̺yes +
k−1
k
· ̺no = ̺E, and due to ε-persuasiveness in the truncated instance
we know ̺yes ≥ ̺no − ε. Combining the two inequalities leads to ̺yes ≥
k̺E−̺yes
k−1 − ε, which implies
̺yes ≥ ̺never −
k−1
k
· ε.
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